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INTRODUCTION 
Whoever said pandemics were equalizers doesn’t know a thing about 
disability legal history.1 It does not take much of a pretext to rollback 
disability rights. This is because disability rights laws, despite enumerated 
principles of equal opportunity and civil rights, have always been viewed as 
“nice to do” and not “must do.”2 Simply put, society continues to 
misunderstand disability—what it means, who the category includes or 
excludes, its relationship to impairment, its valence and construction as an 
identity. Moral and religious-tinged frames have trumped the perception of 
 
1 See Vincent A. Campbell et al., Preparing for and Responding to Pandemic Influenza: Implications for People 
with Disabilities, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S294, S295 (2009) (“Few plans or guidelines provide details about 
how emergency planners can meet the needs of people with disabilities before, during, and after an 
emergency.”); Katie Savin & Laura Guidry-Grimes, Confronting Disability Discrimination During the Pandemic, 
HASTINGS CTR., BIOETHICS F., (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.thehastingscenter.org/confronting-disability-
discrimination-during-the-pandemic/?fbclid=IwAR2ssY8aVhxj5284prI9S2WqZUM3VZvtSzJGQ6DeX4cB 
_FhqmZ7vOv90msk [https://perma.cc/L7ED-PXZT] (“Our country has forced sterilizations of people with 
mental illnesses and developmental disabilities, exploited institutionalized persons with disabilities for 
research, and instituted routine use of prenatal genetic testing that raises concerns about devaluing and 
increasing hostility towards disabled people .	.	.	.”); Stephanie Pappas, Fighting Inequity in the Face of COVID-
19, 51.4 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION MONITOR ON PSYCHOLOGY, COVID-19 SPECIAL 
REPORT (June 1, 2020), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2020/06/covid-fighting-inequity [https://perma.cc/ 
RXM9-XETT] (discussing the disparate impact of COVID-19 experienced by historically marginalized 
communities including people with disabilities and those with intersectional identities). For COVID-19 health 
disparities along racial and ethnic lines, see, for example, Justine Calma, America Set Up Black Communities to 
Be Harder Hit by COVID-19, VERGE (Apr. 8, 2020, 5:24 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/8/21213974/ 
african-americans-covid-19-coronavirus-race-disparities [https://perma.cc/37JY-JU9X] (“The COVID-19 
pandemic is piling on top of a litany of health inequalities in America to kill a disproportionate number of 
African Americans.”); Bethany L. Jones & Jonathan S. Jones, Gov. Cuomo Is Wrong, Covid-19 Is Anything But 
an Equalizer, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/ 
2020/04/05/gov-cuomo-is-wrong-covid-19-is-anything-an-equalizer/ [https://perma.cc/DFD7-XBED] 
(arguing pandemics amplify existing inequalities, such as wealth inequality). 
2 For example, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) includes a large 
underfunded mandate. Although Congress statutorily provided funding for up to 40% of the costs 
of educating students with disabilities, the federal government has never reached half of that 
percentage necessary to provide a “free appropriate public education” to all students with disabilities. 
20 U.S.C. §	1400(c)(3) (2018); see also id. §1411 (a)(2)(ii) (enumerating maximum funding of 40% of 
the average per student cost for every special education student); NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, 
IDEA SERIES, BROKEN PROMISES: THE UNDERFUNDING OF IDEA (2018), 
https://ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_BrokenPromises_508.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AQX-G6WS] 
(examining the historical and current state of IDEA funding and analyzing the impact of a lack of 
full-funding on states’ ability to meet IDEA obligations); Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, IDEA Full Funding, 
www.nea.org/assets/docs/IDEA_Full_Funding_Chart_FY1981-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2KJ-
AX7F] (last visited June 10, 2020) (showing federal funding per year from 1981 to 2012 with the 
maximum funding at 18.5% in 2005, excluding the extension of additional one-time funding due to 
the passing of the American Recovery & Reinvestment Act by Congress in 2009). 
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disability as a protected class akin to race, gender, or national origin.3 This 
view explains Congress’s intent that the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) play not only a remedial role for disability discrimination ex post, but 
also a proactive, ex ante role in upending problematic social norms that treat 
disability and incapacity as synonymous.4 Similarly, the perception of 
disability as a different kind of civil right helps explain the Supreme Court’s 
interpretive missteps in the infancy and adolescence of the ADA and 
Congress’s direct reproach and redirection of the Court in the ADA 
Amendments Act eighteen years later.5 
Inattention to underlying social judgments about disability and the associated 
discrimination has caught up with us. Progressive legislation in this pandemic 
without requisite interventions designed to address how people interpret the 
disability laws offers precarious protections for people with disabilities. The 
stakes could not be higher in some areas, namely, life or death denials of health 
care access based on certain disabilities or biased quality of life measures.6 
 
3 See Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §	2000d, et seq. (2018) (naming race and national origin as 
protected classes as they relate to federal financial assistance); see also Cendri A. Hutcherson & 
James J. Gross, The Moral Emotions: A Social-Functionalist Account of Anger, Disgust, and Contempt, 100 
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 719, 721 (2011) (finding that moral disgust and contempt last 
longer than anger, because they are based on assessments of a person’s character or competence 
instead of whether that person presents an imminent threat); Michael E. Waterstone, Disability 
Constitutional Law, 63 EMORY L.J. 527, 537 (2014) (“Infused in the Court’s opinion is a pitying 
notion	.	.	.	. that one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by something he or she can’t do anything 
about, and that legislators would and had appropriately responded with remedial legislation 
intended to help this group.” (internal quotation omitted)). 
4 Congress provided that 
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, 
and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem; .	.	. 
(5) individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, 
including outright intentional exclusion, the discriminatory effects of architectural, 
transportation, and communication barriers, overprotective rules and policies, failure 
to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification 
standards and criteria, segregation, and regulation to lesser services, programs, 
activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities .	.	.	. 
42 U.S.C. §	12101(a)(2), (5) (2018) (emphasis added). 
5 The “Sutton Trilogy” almost exclusively focused on the definition of disability for gateway 
standing purposes, such as the scope of coverage and determining who is a person with a disability under 
the ADA. See generally Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999). Congress eventually 
directed that the Court abandon this approach with the ADA. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. 
L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§	12101-12102 (2018)) (discussing Supreme Court 
cases about the ADA, including Sutton, and finding that the Supreme Court has improperly narrowed 
and limited “protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect”). 
6 See infra Part I. 
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Disability scholars in recent weeks have largely focused on addressing why 
COVID-19-related rationing on the categorical basis of disability offends 
federal (and state) disability antidiscrimination laws as a means to ensure 
people with disabilities have access to life-saving medical treatment in and 
out of hospitals.7 They persuasively apply disability laws and principles of 
legal and medical ethics to show why disability is an improper consideration 
in rationing care and resources.8 The underlying problem with rationing is 
much larger and is slowly unfolding with respect to access and rights in other 
areas including education, housing, and employment. That is, the rationing 
problem is not just about devaluation of the lives of individuals with 
disabilities; it is a symptom of something much deeper. The pervasive and 
negative impacts of this devaluation will endure long after the immediate 
healthcare issues are tackled. 
This Essay surfaces a broader, unresolved issue in disability law laid bare 
by the current pandemic—that disability rights have never had the public 
understanding and buy-in necessary to exercise and interpret disability laws 
 
7 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, May Hospitals Withhold Ventilators from COVID-19 Patients with 
Pre-Existing Disabilities?, 130 YALE L.J.F. (forthcoming 2020) (arguing that that disability-based 
distinctions violate the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and the Affordable Care Act because all three laws 
prohibit health care providers from discriminating against qualified individuals with disabilities 
because of their disabilities); Govind Persad, Why Disability Law Permits Evidence-Based Triage in a 
Pandemic, 130 YALE L.J.F. 26 (June 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3571139 [https://perma.cc/8PEV-
K8MG] (defending the use of disability-based criteria that may result in denial of life-saving medical 
care when based on “quantity of life” but not “quality of life” determinations); Deborah Hellman & 
Kate M. Nicholson, Rationing and Disability in a State of Crisis (Va. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Paper 
Series, No. 2020-33, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3570088 [https:// 
perma.cc/XVV9-T98J] (arguing that many states have adopted utilitarian approaches to making 
choices about how to ration scarce resources, and that these approaches fail to balance equity with 
utility as demanded by discrimination law); Ari Ne’eman, When It Comes to Rationing, Disability Rights 
Law Prohibits More than Prejudice, HASTINGS CTR., BIOETHICS F. (Apr. 10, 2020), 
https://www.thehastingscenter.org/when-it-comes-to-rationing-disability-rights-law-prohibits-ore-than- 
prejudice/ [https://perma.cc/QLX6-NPRU] (arguing that despite the fact that many states had 
removed blatantly discriminatory provisions from rationing protocols after the Office of Civil Rights 
published a bulletin with such advice, discrimination in the form of disparate impact persisted in 
many of the state rationing protocols and plans). 
8 As an example, 
The ADA requires that ‘reasonable modifications’ must be made to services when 
necessary to accommodate a disabled person .	.	.	. Consider how that approach would 
apply to a policy like that in New York which prescribes a single time frame in which 
all patients must demonstrate a benefit	.	.	.	. [T]his policy does not provide the 
‘reasonable modification’ required by the ADA .	.	. . 
Hellman & Nicholson, supra note 7, at 25; see also Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Fair Allocation of Scarce 
Medical Resources in the Time of Covid-19, 382 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 2049, 2051 (2020) (providing 
six recommendations for the fair and consistent allocation of scarce medical resources during the 
COVID-19 pandemic). 
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in a way that would generate largescale structural reform.9 As a result, when 
people with disabilities are seen (and treated) as unequal, deficient, and 
incapable, legal enforcement of antidiscrimination laws is, at best, seen as 
optional and aspirational, creating space for the current manifestations of 
disability discrimination during the coronavirus crisis. These problems are 
compounded when medical supplies, personnel, and time are limited. 
Part I describes real-time rollbacks of disability rights in the healthcare 
access context that are currently unfolding, and the legal responses designed 
to push back on health care rationing. I then shift to a less studied area, access 
to education, an evolving landscape as students across the country face the 
realities of distance learning.10 Part II argues that the current forms of 
discrimination expose the fundamental information deficits about disability 
that negatively skew legal interpretation and undermine the protections of 
disability laws. Part III identifies key questions and areas of concern as we 
contend with the virus and its aftermath. 
I.  THE CASE OF COVID-19 AND THE ROLLBACK 
OF DISABILITY RIGHTS 
COVID-19 is a perfect storm of systemic flaws with people with 
disabilities at its eye. Early messaging around its limited impact on older 
adults and those with underlying health conditions was intended to assuage 
public concerns by classifying those lives as “already lived” or those “not worth 
living.” This Part offers examples of the rollback of disability rights by public 
and private actors responding to COVID-19 in health care and explores 
emerging examples of discrimination in the provision of public education.11 
 
9 See, e.g., Abigail Abrams, People with Disabilities Face Challenges Campaigning for Office. This 
Group Wants to Change That, TIME (June 11, 2019, 9:03 PM), https://time.com/5604185/disabled-
candidates-training/ [https://perma.cc/W3JA-D2V7] (discussing the effect of a disability on a 
person’s political aspirations). 
10 As of April 3, 2020, Alabama, Arizona, California, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, New 
Mexico, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Virginia, and Vermont have closed public schools for the remainder 
of the academic year. Valerie Strauss, Growing Number of States Say They Are Closing Schools for Rest 
of 2019–2020 Year, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2020, 3:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
education/2020/03/31/california-inches-closer-joining-list-states-expected-keep-schools-closed-2019-
20-school-year/ [https://perma.cc/A2QA-5PDE]. 
11 See Laura Meckler & Valerie Strauss, For Parents Trying to Replicate School for Children with Disabilities, 
a Confounding Task, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/education/for-parents-trying-to-replicate-school-for-children-with-disabilities-a-confounding-
task/2020/03/19/8a1e2876-6940-11ea-9923-57073adce27c_story.html  [https://perma.cc/Y3VG-C3WR] 
(describing particular barriers to distance learning experienced by students with disabilities, including 
difficulty providing support services remotely such as paraeducators). 
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A.  Access to COVID-19-Related Treatment 
I tell my students that smoking gun evidence of discrimination rarely 
exists in contemporary antidiscrimination law. What I also tell them is that if 
examples appear, they will most likely be in the disability context. See Exhibit 
A: guidance and instructions from states to medical providers about the 
proper rationing framework for access to critical medical devices such as 
ventilators. When the COVID-19 pandemic snowballed, several states 
implemented (or dusted off preexisting) ventilator and ICU-bed rationing 
plans that either preferred nondisabled individuals for treatment, or 
categorically excluded certain disabled individuals from their plans.12 Other 
plans completely ignored nonelderly disabled populations.13 Disability rights 
lawyers and advocates quickly mobilized to challenge discriminatory policies 
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the 
 
12 For example, the Alabama rationing plan listed “severe or profound mental retardation,” dementia, 
and brain injury as among several potential reasons to be denied a ventilator in the COVID-19 pandemic. See 
ANNEX TO ESF 8 OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN: CRITERIA FOR 
MECHANICAL VENTILATOR TRIAGE FOLLOWING PROCLAMATION OF MASS-CASUALTY RESPIRATORY 
EMERGENCY 8 (2010), https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6846-alabama-triage-guidelines/02cb4c584 
60e57ea9f05/optimized/full.pdf [https://perma.cc/NF3T-CNQ8 ] (“[P]ersons with severe mental retardation, 
advanced dementia or severe traumatic brain injury may be poor candidates for ventilator support.”). Other 
states’ plans included similarly discriminatory language. See, e.g., LA. DEP’T OF HEALTH, ESF-8 HEALTH & 
MEDICAL SECTION, STATE HOSPITAL CRISIS STANDARD OF CARE GUIDELINES IN DISASTERS 35 
(2018), https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/6856-louisiana-triage-guidelines/d95555bb486d68f7007c/ 
optimized/full.pdf#page=1 [https://perma.cc/UF5T-DJK2] (including among “exclusion criteria” for triage 
“[k]nown severe dementia”); TENN. ALTERED STANDARDS OF CARE WORKGROUP, GUIDANCE FOR THE 
ETHICAL ALLOCATION OF SCARCE RESOURCES DURING A COMMUNITY-WIDE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY AS DECLARED BY THE GOVERNOR OF TENNESSEE 8 (2016), https://int.nyt.com/ 
data/documenthelper/6851-tennessee-triage-guidelines/02cb4c58460e57ea9f05/optimized/full.pdf#page=1 
[https://perma.cc/ED2X-V5FL] (“[T]here are certain medical conditions or situations where 
maximally aggressive care will not be able to be provided to every individual.	.	.	. [Including t]hose 
who require such a large amount of resources that it is not feasible to accommodate their 
hospitalization in a prolonged mass-casualty situation.”). 
13 For example, one medical center provided the following guidance for resource allocation: 
The standard construct for medical resource allocation [in Washington state] in time 
of scarcity is based upon a utilitarian framework, often stated as making decisions that 
provide the greatest good for the greatest number . . . . Greatest good . . . is generally 
considered maximizing survival . . . qualified as healthy, long-term survival, 
recognizing that this represents weighting the survival of young otherwise healthy 
patients more heavily than that of older, chronically debilitated patients. 
UNIV. OF WASH. MED. CTR., MATERIAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES 1 
https://covid-19.uwmedicine.org/Screening%20and%20Testing%20Algorithms/Other%20Inpatient%20 
Clinical%20Guidance/Clinical%20Care%20in%20ICU/Material%20Resource%20Allocation.COVID19.docx 
[https://perma.cc/Q92T-N4R4]. 
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Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act.14 
Advocates have succeeded in getting the Office of Civil Rights of the 
Department of Health and Human Services to issue guidance reminding 
HHS-funded programs that civil rights laws, such as the ADA, prohibit 
rationing policies based on “stereotypes, assessments of quality of life, or 
judgments about a person’s relative ‘worth’ based on the presence or absence 
of disabilities or age.”15 This, in turn, pushed certain states—recently, 
Alabama and Pennsylvania—to rescind or clarify facially discriminatory 
ventilator rationing policies that previously discriminated on the basis of 
certain disabilities and age.16 
The reality is that health care treatment decisions have always rested with 
an individual professional’s medical judgment, something necessarily limited 
 
14 See, e.g., Letter from Rhonda Brownstein, Legal Dir., Alabama Disabilities Advocacy 
Program, to Roger Severino, Dir., Office for Civil Rights (Mar. 24, 2020) (on file with author) 
(stating the Alabama ventilator rationing plan “specifically singles out and excludes certain people 
with intellectual disabilities from access to ventilators in the event of rationing, in direct violation 
of federal law”). Similar letters were sent in response to facially discriminatory rationing plans 
implemented in Connecticut, Kansas, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 
Tennessee, Utah, and Washington. See COVID-19 Medical Rationing & Hospital Visitor Policies, CTR. 
FOR PUB. REPRESENTATION, https://www.centerforpublicrep.org/covid-19-medical-rationing 
[https://perma.cc/54ZX-76TM] (last updated June 26, 2020) (collecting administrative complaints 
filed with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services against listed states). Finally, 
national disability rights organizations, such as the Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, 
also published letters outlining the illegality of medical rationing on the basis of disability, calling 
for state governors to take action to ensure equitable treatment for people with disabilities. See, e.g., 
Letter from Susan Henderson, Exec. Dir., Disability Rights Educ. & Def. Fund, to Honorable 
Gavin Newsom, Governor of the State of California (Mar. 20, 2020), https://dredf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/03/DREDF-COVID-19-Letter-to-Gov-Newsom.pdf [https://perma.cc/TM6D-
GBM4] (calling for non-discrimination in medical rationing as well as continued access to services 
that allow people with disabilities to live in communities rather than institutional settings). 
15 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN ACTION, CIVIL 
RIGHTS, HIPAA, AND THE CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) 1 (2020), https://www.hhs.gov/ 
sites/default/files/ocr-bulletin-3-28-20.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8U2-JQ8H]. 
16 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Office for Civil Rights, OCR Reaches 
Early Case Resolution with Alabama After It Removes Discriminatory Ventilator Triaging Guidelines (Apr. 
8, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/04/08/ocr-reaches-early-case-resolution-alabama-after-it-
removes-discriminatory-ventilator-triaging.html [https://perma.cc/Y94L-X547] (announcing resolution of 
compliance review of the State of Alabama after Alabama removed ventilator rationing guidelines in response 
to formal complaints filed alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and age); Press Release, U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Office for Civil Rights, OCR Resolves Civil Rights Complaint 
Against Pennsylvania After It Revises Its Pandemic Health Care Triaging Policies to Protect Against 
Disability Discrimination (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/04/16/ocr-resolves-
civil-rights-complaint-against-pennsylvania-after-it-revises-its-pandemic-health-care.html [https:// 
perma.cc/5CWS-7HQL] (resolving compliance review after the Pennsylvania Department of 
Health revised existing triage guidelines, including those that “used ‘preexisting conditions that are 
disabilities’ to determine a priority score”). 
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by an individual’s education and experiences.17 This is not meant to impugn 
those healthcare professionals who are on the front lines of this public health 
crisis. This Essay addresses structural issues beyond any one rationing 
decision. Medical schools notoriously fail to adequately acknowledge and 
combat students’ implicit biases against people with disabilities, yet research 
demonstrates that doctors and other medical professionals harbor these biases 
in their care and treatment of disabled patients.18 The existence of implicit 
biases and heuristics that drive decisionmaking, particularly in high stress 
situations requiring quick decisions, casts doubt on recent state efforts to 
immunize medical professionals from liability.19 
Notably, the poster child of eugenic reasoning, Buck v. Bell,20 is often 
portrayed as a relic of the past and reminder of the horrors and lessons of the 
eugenics movement in the United States. Law professors teaching this case 
like to amaze students with the fact that Buck—with an 8-1 majority authored 
by beloved legal jurist Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes and the support of 
progressive justices such as Louis Brandeis—remains intact.  That is, its 
eugenics-based upholding of Virginia’s involuntary sterilization law in the 
public interest, despite the law itself being no longer on the books, lives in 
legal databases and, more importantly, its underlying principles live on 
today.21 While states can no longer justify facially discriminatory laws 
promoting compulsory sterilization of marginalized women (e.g., women of 
color, poor women, or disabled women) on the basis of disability, pretext 
prevails, as we witness in the COVID-19 legal and policy responses. 
 
17 See Chloë FitzGerald & Samia Hurst, Implicit Bias in Healthcare Professionals: A Systematic 
Review, 18 BMC MED. ETHICS 1, 2 (2017) (describing the ample literature on implicit biases among 
health care professionals that “operate to the disadvantage of those who are already vulnerable 
[including] minority ethnic populations, immigrants, the poor, low health-literacy individuals, sexual 
minorities, children, women, the elderly, the mentally ill, the overweight and the disabled.”). 
Discussion and analysis of the proper criteria for allocating COVID-19 medical treatment—quality 
of life, lottery system, etc.—are beyond the scope of this Essay. See supra note 7 (providing recent 
examples of the excellent literature on rationing and disability discrimination). 
18 See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 7-8 (explaining that doctors reveal significant biases against 
people with disabilities, partly because so few doctors themselves are individuals with disabilities). 
See also Letter from Samuel R. Bagenstos, Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich. Law School, to Honorable 
Gretchen Whitmer, Governor of Mich. & Honorable Dana Nessel, Att’y Gen. of Michigan (Mar. 27, 
2020) (on file with author) (responding to the Michigan Guardianship Association’s request for an 
emergency order to lower the bar for guardians to provide DNR orders for their wards who, for 
example, rely on ventilators that could be used to treat a nondisabled coronavirus patient). 
19 Jacob Gershman & Melanie Grayce West, New York Moves to Shield Doctors from Lawsuits 
While Fighting Coronavirus, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-
moves-to-shield-doctors-from-lawsuits-while-fighting-coronavirus-11585868982?ns=prod/accounts-
wsj [https://perma.cc/Y3TN-Q8SX]. 
20 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
21 See, e.g., Jasmine E. Harris, Commentary: Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), in FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS: REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE REWRITTEN 15 (Kimberly M. Mutcherson ed., 2019) 
(offering the socio-political context of Buck v. Bell and arguing that its legacy continues today). 
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Moreover, without a strong constitutional safety net to fall back on,22 
disability law must rely on statutory interpretations which, in turn, rely on 
legal decisionmakers who often lack the requisite understanding of disability 
to interpret the laws in line with congressional intent. 
Eugenic principles not only underwrite current state guidance to medical 
professionals regarding the rationing of treatment, medical equipment, and 
medication, but also the course of experimentation in search for treatments.23 
Most recently, Dr. Robin Armstrong, facility director and on-site physician 
at The Resort of Texas City, a nursing home in Texas, started giving 
hydroxychloroquine—a medication used to stave off malaria and treat 
autoimmune disorders such as lupus or rheumatoid arthritis—to dozens of 
elderly and disabled patients diagnosed with COVID-19.24 However, many 
scientists argue that using hydroxychloroquine to treat the coronavirus lacks 
empirical data, and while its negative effects continue to be publicly 
debated,25 the National Institutes of Health, United States Food and Drug 
Administration, and the World Health Organization recently ended active 
research studies and clinical trials for the drug’s use to combat COVID-19.26 
These warnings temper the Trump Administration’s continued insistence on 
the drug’s remedial value—at one point the President touted its therapeutic 
value and professed his personal use of the drug as a prophylaxis27—and 
 
22 The Supreme Court held that state decisions regarding disability are subject to rational basis 
review, the lowest constitutional standard of review with significant deference to states. City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985). See also infra Pt. III. 
23 Several states included categorical exclusions limiting access to ventilators for people with 
disabilities, and in response disability groups across the country filed complaints. See Joseph Shapiro, 
Disability Groups File Federal Complaint About COVID-19 Care Rationing Plans, NPR (Mar. 23, 2020, 
4:12 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/03/23/820303309/disability-groups-file-federal-complaint-
about-covid-19-care-rationing-plans [https://perma.cc/VP2J-LF8V] (noting that several disability 
groups filed a complaint with the Department of Health and Human Services because doctors in 
Washington state were told to give ventilators to young, healthy people). 
24 Vanessa Romo, COVID-19 Patients Given Unproven Drug in Texas Nursing Home In ‘Disconcerting’ 
Move, NPR (Apr. 10, 2020, 6:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/10/830348837/covid-19-patients-given-
unproven-drug-in-texas-nursing-home-garnering-criticism [https://perma.cc/X9K9-8TTM]. 
25 See, e.g., Chris Dall, Authors Retract Controversial Hydroxychloroquine Study, CTR. FOR 
INFECTIOUS DISEASE RES. & POL’Y, U. MINN. (June 4, 2020), https://www.cidrap.umn.edu/news-
perspective/2020/06/authors-retract-controversial-hydroxychloroquine-study [https://perma.cc/J4S9-
MXXV] (explaining the controversial retraction of two empirical studies on hydroxychloroquine’s 
negative effects on the heart based on failure to discuss the underlying data set). 
26 Christianna Silva, NIH Halts Hydroxychloroquine Study; Says ‘Unlikely’ To Help COVID-19 
Patients, NPR (June 20, 2020, 4:52 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-
updates/2020/06/20/881260031/nih-halts-hydroxychloroquine-study-says-unlikely-to-help-covid-19-
patients [https://perma.cc/2JAH-5QBK]. 
27 See Jane C. Timm, Trump Says He’s No Longer Taking Hydroxychloroquine, NBC NEWS (May 25, 
2020, 6:14 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-says-he-s-no-longer-taking-
hydroxychloroquine-n1214301 [https://perma.cc/EQ85-28K4] (describing the President’s completion of 
a course of the drug despite the absence of scientific studies showing its effectiveness and safety). 
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conservative GOP commentators like Glenn Beck and politicians like 
Lieutenant Governor Dan Patrick of Texas’s calls for “controlled voluntary 
infection” strategies, akin to the one advanced by Dr. Armstrong at the 
nursing home.28 Moreover, Dr. Armstrong’s method of observation—without 
controls and research protocols of a formal study and with serious questions 
about informed consent—may run afoul of medical ethics.29 
Far from “unprecedented” in the disability space, this déjà vu moment 
triggers recent memories of the Willowbrook State School, a now defunct 
state institution for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities. 
In the 1950s through the 1970s, medical doctors at Willowbrook charged with 
the wellbeing of young people with intellectual and developmental 
disabilities infected healthy children with a live hepatitis virus by feeding 
them hepatitis-contaminated feces in the name of finding a cure for the 
disease.30 Willowbrook closed its doors in 1987 and New York City purchased 
and repurposed part of the campus to open the College of Staten Island in 
1993.31 
B.  Access to a Free Appropriate [and Remote] Public Education 
Public programs and services, such as libraries and schools, have responded 
to shelter-in-place orders that require new ways of service delivery, at least in 
 
28 See Kathryn Olivarius, The Dangerous History of Immunoprivilege, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/opinion/coronavirus-immunity-passports.html [https://perma.cc/7R36 
-URHD] (describing the strategy to build “herd immunity” as one which historically resulted in a 
situation in which “immunological discrimination become just one more form of bias in a region 
already premised on racial, ethnic, gender and financial inequality”); see, e.g., Peter Baker et al., 
Trump’s Aggressive Advocacy of Malaria Drug for Treating Coronavirus Divides Medical Community, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-malaria-
drug.html [https://perma.cc/UST3-Q2XR]. 
29 Romo, supra note 24 (reporting that Dr. Armstrong stated prescribing medications to 
patients without explicit consent from the patient or family members was “common” for physicians). 
30 Doriane Lambelet Coleman, The Legal Ethics of Pediatric Research, 57 DUKE L.J. 517, 531 
(2007). Dr. Saul Krugman was the lead medical doctor at the Willowbrook State School. See Saul 
Krugman et al., Hepatitis Virus: Effect of Heat on the Infectivity and Antigenicity of the MS-1 and MS-2 
Strains, 122 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 432 (1970) (describing the methods and results of the hepatitis 
studies at Willowbrook); Saul Krugman, Special Article: The Willowbrook Hepatitis Studies Revisited: 
Ethical Aspects, 8 REVIEWS OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 157 (1986) (recognizing widespread criticism 
of his Willowbrook experiments and defending his position that such studies were “ethical and 
justifiable” because, among other reasons, the children, although healthy, could contract the disease 
in the future and their parents consented to the study). See generally DAVID J. ROTHMAN & SHEILA 
M. ROTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK WARS 260-66 (2005) (discussing the history of the 
Willowbrook including Dr. Krugman’s experiments and the debates surrounding them). 
31 Dan Gunderman, Revisiting the Atrocities that Once Consumed the Halls of Willowbrook State 
School in Staten Island, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 9, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/ 
national/atrocities-consumed-halls-willowbrook-school-article-1.3030716 [https://perma.cc/5PKB-NX8P]. 
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the short-term.32 Most school-age children are no longer in classrooms—
school districts kept their doors shuttered through the end of the academic 
year and many plan to extend remote learning for the coming academic year.33 
Distance learning is a new norm for a majority of public school students 
nationwide with great variation in the details, quality, and content of that 
education.34 Although identification of disability discrimination in online 
spaces may be less apparent, the rights of an estimated seven million students 
with disabilities nationwide are particularly vulnerable to rollbacks, not to 
mention the collateral consequences of educational regression.35 Several school 
districts initially delayed the move to distance education because they feared 
potential legal liability if they could not offer students with disabilities the 
same quality of education as their nondisabled peers, confusion attributable, 
in part, to an early guidance document issued by the Department of 
 
32 See, e.g., PUB. LIBRARY ASS’N, PUBLIC LIBRARIES RESPOND TO COVID-19: SURVEY OF 
RESPONSE & ACTIVITIES (2020), http://www.ala.org/pla/sites/ala.org.pla/files/content/advocacy/ 
covid-19/PLA-Libraries-Respond-Survey_Aggregate-Results_FINAL2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HKG-
SNCS] (finding that although 98% of libraries closed to the public in response to COVID-19, they 
have continued online renewal policies, expanded social media and e-books, or added additional public 
services such as virtual programming). 
33 INST. FOR PUB. POLICY & SOC. RESEARCH, MICHIGAN STATE UNIV., STATE POLICIES 
TO ADDRESS COVID-19 SCHOOL CLOSURE, https://ippsr.msu.edu/state-policies-address-covid-
19-school-closure [https://perma.cc/88VD-YTCP] (last updated Apr. 23, 2020). See Lesli A. 
Maxwell, Reopening Schools: Here Are Some Districts' Plans for the Fall, EDUC. WK.: DISTRICT 
DOSSIER (Jul. 13, 2020, 6:12 PM) https://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/District_Dossier/2020/07/ 
reopening_schools_district_plans.html [https://perma.cc/3AMD-B58S] (offering examples of public school 
districts that will offer remote learning only in the fall of 2020, including Los Angeles Unified and 
San Diego Unified Public School Districts in California, Palm Beach County School District in 
Florida, and Metropolitan Nashville School District in Tennessee). 
34 See, e.g., Bree Dusseault & Travis Pillow, Still No Consistent Plan for Remote Learning for Hundreds of 
Thousands of Students at Some of America’s Biggest School Districts, CTR. ON REINVENTING PUB. EDUC., THE 
LENS (May 15, 2020), https://www.crpe.org/thelens/still-no-consistent-plan-remote-learning-hundreds-
thousands-students-some-americas-biggest [https://perma.cc/6MA7-W3UT] (finding that a majority of 
school districts reviewed provide some form of instruction but 33% of those districts—serving 
hundreds of thousands of students in some of the largest cities in the country—continue to operate 
without consistent expectations for teachers, such as requirements that teachers provide feedback 
on students’ schoolwork); Chris Berdik, How School Districts Are Outsmarting a Microbe, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/23/education/learning/coronavirus-online-class-
public-schools.html [https://perma.cc/8XCQ-MHD4] (describing school districts’ efforts to adjust 
to the reality of distance learning because of the coronavirus). 
35 See, e.g., Laura Meckler & Valerie Strauss, For Parents Trying to Replicate School for Children with 
Disabilities, a Confounding Task, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
local/education/for-parents-trying-to-replicate-school-for-children-with-disabilities-a-confounding-
task/2020/03/19/8a1e2876-6940-11ea-9923-57073adce27c_story.html [https://perma.cc/G7WR-EKJP]; 
Elissa Nadworny, With Schools Closed, Kids with Disabilities Are More Vulnerable Than Ever, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Mar. 27, 2020) https://www.npr.org/2020/03/27/821926032/with-schools-closed-kids-with-
disabilities-are-more-vulnerable-than-ever [https://perma.cc/LL2P-69RC]. 
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Education’s Office for Civil Rights.36 A problematic trend has emerged in 
some states, such as New Jersey, where school districts have asked parents of 
children receiving special education to sign waivers promising not to sue the 
district in order to access online services.37  
On March 27, 2020, Congress passed the CARES Act,38 which required 
Education Secretary Betsy DeVos to prepare and submit a report to the Senate 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions and the House 
Committee on Appropriations regarding recommendations on any additional 
waivers under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).39 
Thereafter, the Department of Education received a number of requests for 
“limited waivers” of IDEA provisions to allow for greater “flexibilities,” 
opportunities to meet the needs of “all students,” and avoidance of liability for 
non-compliance with special education requirements that could lead to 
litigation.40 The central argument advanced by two organizational applicants 
 
36 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, FACT SHEET: ADDRESSING THE RISK 
OF COVID-19 IN SCHOOLS WHILE PROTECTING THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF STUDENTS 3 (2020), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/ocr-coronavirus-fact-sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
B6G8-4XTS] [hereinafter OCR FACT SHEET] (“If a school district closes its schools and does not 
provide any educational services to the general student population, then a school would not be 
required to provide services to students with disabilities during that same period of time.”). 
37 Rebecca Klein, To Access Online Services, New Jersey Students with Disabilities Must Promise Not to Sue, 
HUFFPOST (Apr. 25, 2020, 1:33 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/new-jersey-special-education-online-
services-waiver-coronavirus_n_5ea4637ec5b6d3763590790c [https://perma.cc/52TX-KV4T]. 
38 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 
Stat. 286 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§	9001-80(2020)) (including $2 trillion in aid to help individuals 
and businesses struggling economically in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic). 
39 See Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, §	3511(d)(4), Pub. L. 
No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 286 (2020) (instructing the Secretary of the Department of Education to report 
to Congress no later than thirty days from the date of enactment any recommendations on waivers 
under education laws including the IDEA). See also Letter from Phyllis Wolfram, Exec. Dir., 
Council of Adm’rs of Special Educ. and John Eisenberg, Exec. Dir., Nat’l Ass’n of State Dirs. of 
Special Educ., to Mark Schultz, Acting Assistant Sec’y and Laurie VanderPloeg, Dir., U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., at 1 (March 31, 2020) [hereinafter Wolfram Letter] (on file with author) (“[T]he CARES 
Act	.	.	. requires Secretary DeVos to write a report with information regarding flexibility that might 
be necessary during the COVID-19 pandemic.”). Since Congress enacted the IDEA under its 
spending clause authority, states agree to implement federal special education law in exchange for 
federal dollars. 20 U.S.C. §§	1451(a), (c) (2018). The IDEA allows for application to the Secretary 
of Education for waivers under certain circumstances. Id. §	1412(a)(18)(C)(i). 
40 Wolfram Letter, supra note 39, at 1. In addition to the IDEA waivers, DeVos considered (and 
rejected) waivers of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act which provides protection from disability 
discrimination from public and private grantees of federal financial assistance, including public 
schools. See BETSY DEVOS, U.S. SEC’Y OF EDUC., RECOMMENDED WAIVER AUTHORITY 
UNDER SECTION 3511(D)(4) OF DIVISION A OF THE CORONAVIRUS AID, RELIEF, AND 
ECONOMIC SECURITY ACT (“CARES ACT”) 11 (2020) (informing Congress that Secretary DeVos 
does not request waiver of “any of the core tenets” of the Rehabilitation Act); Pub. L. No. 93-112 
§	504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (1973) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §	794a (2018)) (“No otherwise 
qualified [individual with a disability] in the United States, .	.	. shall, solely by reason of his [or her 
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requesting waivers—the Council of Administrators of Special Education and 
the National Association of State Directors of Special Education—
emphasized the absence of legal or doctrinal guidance needed to “implement 
a law that was not built for this situation.”41 These petitioners sought waivers 
of certain procedural and substantive requirements of the IDEA, including 
the scope of free appropriate public education and data collection.42 An 
opinion piece by one school attorney noted that “schools cannot ‘flex’ without 
congressional action.”43 The Director of Advocacy for the National 
Superintendents’ Association similarly requested waivers because “meeting all 
the requirements in the IDEA is impossible.”44 Tellingly, these calls for greater 
“flexibility” through waivers also tapped into concerns about limited resources 
and fairness, for example, that “school staff [are] stretched thin” and that, while 
all students face educational regression, only those with special education 
services have legal protections and claims to compensatory education.45 
Federal special education laws and regulations consistently reinforce the 
applicability of civil rights protections (with built-in flexibility) even in times 
of national emergency.46 Most recently, Secretary DeVos ratified this position 
in her report to Congress pursuant to the CARES Act. After considering the 
need for waivers of the IDEA’s provisions due to the coronavirus, Secretary 
 
disability], be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”). 
41 Wolfram Letter, supra note 39, at 1, 4 (“[I]t is clear to us that the IDEA, the Rehabilitation Act, 
and other federal laws were not written anticipating a global pandemic that has closed a large majority 
of schools across the country, and for this reason we urge you to seek these specific flexibilities.”). 
42 Id. at 2-3 (outlining requested waivers of IDEA provisions). 
43 Miriam Kurtzig Freedman, Special Education in the Time of Coronavirus: DeVos and Congress Need to 
Act!, THOMAS B. FORDHAM INST. (Apr. 14, 2020), https://fordhaminstitute.org/national/commentary/ 
special-education-time-coronavirus-devos-and-congress-need-act [https://perma.cc/3J5W-6YD5]. C.f. Doron 
Dorfman, [Un]Usual Suspects: Deservingness, Scarcity, and Disability Rights, 10 UC IRVINE L. REV. 557, 
564 (2020) (finding, counterintuitively, that scarcity of coveted public resources has no effect on the 
degree of suspicion against people with disabilities perceived to be faking; rather, degree of 
“deservingness” drives suspicion). 
44 Michelle Diament, DeVos Could Recommend Waiving IDEA Protections, DISABILITY SCOOP, 
(Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.disabilityscoop.com/2020/04/13/devos-could-recommend-waiving-
idea-protections/28146/ [https://perma.cc/AYR6-8295]. 
45 Id.; Freedman, supra note 43. 
46 See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV. REPORT, R42881, EDUCATION-RELATED 
REGULATORY FLEXIBILITIES, WAIVERS, AND FEDERAL ASSISTANCE IN RESPONSE TO 
DISASTERS AND NATIONAL EMERGENCIES 2 (2019) (describing legislation enacted in response to 
the hurricanes in 2017 providing for waivers and flexibility in school funding); OCR FACT SHEET, 
supra note 36, at 2 (requiring schools that provide instruction to all students to provide special 
education services in accordance with students’ IEPs); see also Joseph F. ex rel. Endrew F. v. Douglas 
Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 999-1000 (2017) (requiring school districts to provide special 
education students with a “free appropriate public education” “reasonably calculated to enable [her] 
to make progress appropriate in light of [her] circumstances”); Letter from the Council of Parent 
Attorneys and Advocates, Inc., to Senator Lamar Alexander et al. (Apr. 13, 2020) (on file with author) 
(recommending several approaches to ensure IDEA protections continue despite COVID-19 burdens). 
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DeVos informed Congress that “[t]he Department is not requesting waiver 
authority for any of the core tenets of the IDEA or Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, most notably a free appropriate public education 
(FAPE) in the least restrictive environment (LRE).”47 This conclusion has 
prompted at least one teachers union to seek emergency injunctive relief to 
prevent federal and state education agencies from enforcing the special 
education law without the waiver provider by Congress under the CARES 
Act.48 Specifically, the Chicago Teachers Union claims that compliance with 
existing laws and regulations requires teachers and case managers to review 
and complete approximately 56,000 Individualized Education Programs 
(IEPs) with approximately six weeks remaining in the academic school year.49 
School districts’ and administrators’ requests for statutory immunity from 
disability discrimination lawsuits have heightened in recent weeks as school 
districts plan for fall instruction. A new report from the National School 
Boards Association (NSBA), School Superintendents Association (AASA), 
and the Association of Educational Service Agencies (AESA) calls for amnesty 
from litigation because “during this unprecedented pandemic, FAPE comes 
with tremendous costs to budgets and additional burdens on personnel that 
challenge school districts trying their best under the circumstances to meet the 
requirements.”50 Empirical data collected from a national survey of school 
leaders revealed that approximately three out of four school districts 
determined that the most onerous service to provide during COVID-19 was 
“equitable education and related services for students with disabilities.”51 The 
provision of FAPE, while certainly difficult, should not absolve school districts 
from compliance with existing laws. In fact, legal accountability is even more 
important during this period.  
While the current pandemic is unprecedented in scope, the United States 
has experienced natural disasters and other national emergencies that 
previously raised questions about the requirements and capacity to serve 
 
47 BETSY DEVOS, U.S. SEC’Y OF EDUC., RECOMMENDED WAIVER AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 
3511(D)(4) OF DIVISION A OF THE CORONAVIRUS AID, RELIEF, AND ECONOMIC SECURITY ACT 
(“CARES ACT”), at 11 (2020), https://www2.ed.gov/documents/coronavirus/cares-waiver-
report.pdf?utm_content=&utm_medium=email&utm_name=&utm_source=govdelivery&utm_
term= [https://perma.cc/HNW3-WF4A]. 
48 Complaint ¶ 1, Chicago Teachers Union v. Betsy DeVos, No. 1:20-02958 (N.D. Ill., filed 
May 19, 2020). 
49 Id. ¶¶ 1-3. 
50 NAT’L SCH. BOARD ASS’N, SCH. SUPERINTENDENTS ASS’N, & ASS’N OF EDUC. SERV. 
AGENCIES, SCHOOL LEADER VOICES: CONCERNS AND CHALLENGES TO PROVIDING 
MEANINGFUL IDEA-RELATED SERVICES DURING COVID-19 7 (2020) (emphasis added), 
https://www.aasa.org/uploadedFiles/AASA_Blog(1)/Advocacy%20IDEA%20White%20Paper%20FIN
AL.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7WF-J6P8]. 
51 Id. at 9. 
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students with disabilities. For example, in 2017, Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and 
Maria displaced students and disrupted school instruction for tens of 
thousands of students, including students receiving special education services 
through their Individualized Education Programs (IEPs).52 In 2005, the 
combination of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita displaced over 50,000 students 
with disabilities.53 The nature of the current public health crisis may differ 
from these hurricanes in scope—such as the certainty of an end point as well 
as the greater numbers of students affected; however, the suggestion that 
school districts could not possibly figure out how to meaningfully serve 
students with disabilities as grounds for waivers of substantive provisions of 
the IDEA is hyperbolic at best. In fact, federal relief legislation in prior crises 
specifically included funding to get students with disabilities back into 
routines as quickly as possible, including hiring additional teachers and 
support staff to reimagine service delivery without waiving the substantive 
rights of students under the IDEA.54 
While uncertainties abound with respect to COVID-19, we can identify 
how past public emergencies further exacerbated the inequities in education 
experienced by students with disabilities during and (though not often 
discussed) long after these crises end.55 Most damage estimates for planning or 
recovery purposes of past crises did not account for “indirect costs secondary 
 
52 NATIONAL FORUM ON EDUCATION STATISTICS, FORUM GUIDE TO PLANNING FOR, 
COLLECTING, AND MANAGING DATA ABOUT STUDENTS DISPLACED BY A CRISIS 5-6 (2019) 
(noting that Hurricane Maria displaced “tens of thousands of students” from Puerto Rico and that 
“[i]n Florida alone, over 11,000 Puerto Rican evacuees enrolled in the state’s public elementary and 
secondary schools within the five months following Hurricane Maria”) (citation omitted). U.S. 
DEP’T OF EDUC., NON-REGULATORY GUIDANCE ON FLEXIBILITY AND WAIVERS FOR 
GRANTEES AND PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS IMPACTED BY FEDERALLY DECLARED DISASTERS 12-
13 (2017) (“The Department currently has no legal authority to waive IDEA requirements, except 
for the requirement to maintain State financial support for special education and related 
services	.	.	.	.”) (on file with author); see also 20 U.S.C. §	1412(a)(18)(B) (2018). 
53 John F. Pane et al., Student Displacement in Louisiana After the Hurricanes of 2005: Experiences of Public 
Schools and Their Students, RAND GULF STATES POLICY INSTITUTE xi (2006) (stating that Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita caused the largest displacement of students in U.S. history with nearly 200,000 public 
school pre-K-12 students displaced in Louisiana alone). LEX FRIEDEN, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON 
DISABILITY, THE IMPACT OF HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA ON PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES: A 
LOOK BACK AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 19 (2006) (on file with author) (noting that Hurricane 
Katrina displaced approximately 247,000 students from Louisiana, 125,000 from Mississippi, and 3,000 from 
Alabama; Hurricane Rita displaced approximately 86,000 students from Texas). 
54 FRIEDEN, supra note 53, at 20 (describing federal relief programs designed to “help children 
with disabilities return to school as quickly as possible”). One key difference in those situations is 
that while schools in the affected areas were shuttered or destroyed, there were other schools outside 
of the districts and states that took in affected students and agreed to provide a FAPE to all students 
including those receiving special education. Id. at 19-20. 
55 See, e.g., Louis Foglia, How Katrina Changed Special Education in New Orleans, CNN MONEY 
(Aug. 28, 2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/08/14/news/hurricane-katrina-special-education/ 
[https://perma.cc/W936-Q6H7]. 
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to tangible loss and disruption, as these costs are less quantifiable and hidden 
from view.”56 Post-COVID-19, indirect costs will likely include increased 
special education expenditures resulting from increased numbers of students 
eligible for and requiring special education services to access a FAPE, a rise in 
punitive school discipline policies and practices that result in greater contact 
with the criminal justice system, and overall, lost productivity to society.57 
Even if the threat of waivers of some or all of the IDEA’s procedural and 
substantive rights disappears (directly or indirectly through requests for legal 
immunity) and children with disabilities are afforded some modified online 
education,58 families of children with disabilities are without the necessary 
services that allow students to actually access remote education such as 
physical and occupational therapy, behavioral supports, one-to-one aides, as 
well as wrap-around socio-economic supports such as respite care or, for 
children on the autism spectrum, intensive in-home therapies like Applied 
Behavioral Analysis (also known as ABA). Education and childcare have 
privatized, with parents of children with disabilities (and indigent children) 
disproportionately disadvantaged. These families cannot simply turn on a 
computer and allow their children to participate in online instruction 
independently without support and supervision.59 
When equality of opportunity becomes too onerous or costly, disability 
rights take a backseat in the name of broader public interests. Limited 
 
56 Berre Burch et al., Children and Disasters: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina, 10 WHITTIER J. 
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 3, 4 (2010). 
57 Id. 
58 California parents received notice of the modifications offered by local school districts in 
response to covid-19. See, e.g., Letter from Davis Joint Unified School District to Parent [Redacted] 
(attached to Apr. 17, 2020 email) (on file with author). Two problems exist. First, procedurally, the 
decision regarding services is being made unilaterally without input from the parent in the design of the 
proposed modifications. Parents are invited to reach out and share “concerns” about the offer of FAPE 
and they are provided with a copy of the procedural safeguards if they disagree with the district’s plan 
to serve their child. Id. However, families should be consulted prior to the decision to provide modified 
services to ensure the services reflect, as best as possible, not only the child’s preexisting IEP but what 
the child needs to access FAPE in the new learning environment. This is not an onerous requirement 
and reflects the IDEA’s collaborative intent. It is unrealistic to think that families who disagree with 
the substantive offer of services would be able to exercise their procedural rights by filing formal due 
process complaints and exhausting administrative procedures during the coronavirus. Second, the 
content of the offers of FAPE are, understandably, much less than pre-COVID-19; however, many of 
the offers reflect less than an hour a week of support for students with disabilities, do not account for 
the in-home modifications that are required to support parents who have stepped into the role of 
resource teachers, para-educators, and general education instructors, and will likely go unchallenged by 
parents and guardians overwhelmed with the new normal of COVID-19. 
59 See, e.g., Aliyya Swaby, Coronavirus in Texas: Special Education Students Fall Behind as Texas Schools 
Scramble to Adapt, TEX. TRIB. (Apr. 10, 2020, 12:00 AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2020/04/10/texas-
schools-closed-coronavirus-struggling-special-education/ [https://perma.cc/9WB8-U2RR] (highlighting 
some of the difficulties faced by parents who are now having to oversee the education of their children 
who previously had access to special education services). 
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resources, however, are invalid justifications for differential treatment on the 
basis of disability. More accurately, they manifest systemic flaws in planning 
and proper resource allocation.60 Part II explains why rollbacks of disability 
rights come early and often in times of public emergency. 
II.  THE INSTABILITY OF DISABILITY RIGHTS 
Why are disability rights so precarious? Part II argues that the ways in 
which disability norms evolved have made disability rights less stable and, 
thus, more susceptible to negotiation rather than enforcement. To be clear, 
disability is pervasive in society and it is one of the only identity groups 
everyone will become a part of as they age. Thus, while I contend there is a 
general information deficit about the complexities of disability stemming 
from the absence of meaningful access and inclusion, some of this information 
(or misinformation) comes from the proximity of disability in familial and 
other relationships, which, without contextualization, can backfire and 
actually further pervert social norms of disability.61 Three interrelated socio-
legal elements have produced a set of unstable social norms which continue 
to destabilize disability rights today. 
A.  Morality, Medicine, and Bad Differences 
First, disability discrimination is, at least in part, a product of early 
religious and private regulation of socio-economic supports. States were 
largely absent from providing services for people with disabilities. 
Responsibility for the care of people with disabilities fell to families and, later, 
charitable organizations often affiliated with religious institutions.62 People 
understood, and some continue to understand, disability as a “bad-
difference,”63 a family burden, or a mark of immorality, divine punishment 
for an act of the individual or family. Interactions with people with disabilities 
did not result in typical relationships—rather, they were transformed into 
acts of care, divine obligation, benevolence, service, and pity for the “less 
 
60 For example, until the IDEA Amendments in 2004, school districts facing a shortage of 
credentialed special education teachers could (and often did) waive credential requirements to staff 
classrooms. See generally ELAINE CARLSON ET AL., STUDY OF PERSONNEL NEEDS IN SPECIAL 
EDUCATION KEY FINDINGS (SPeNSE) (2002), https://education.ufl.edu/spense/files/2013/06/Key-
Findings-_Final_.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EZ6-5C6R]. 
61 See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1383, 1388 (2012) (“The 
current messages about disability surrounding [key] moments [where individuals make decisions 
that affect whether or not they or their children might be disabled in the future] tend to be 
misleading and negative, rooted in the outside view of disability.”). 
62 See, e.g., Jasmine E. Harris, Taking Disability Public, 169 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) 
(on file with author) [hereinafter Harris, Taking Disability]. 
63 Elizabeth Barnes, Valuing Disability, Causing Disability, 125 ETHICS 88, 89 (2014). 
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fortunate.”64 This has had a profound impact on social norms of disability 
today. Consider why a simple hello or polite act of holding a door for a person 
with a more apparent disability gets elevated from ordinary etiquette 
(without a second thought), to an act of service, a marker of moral character, 
worthy of (self and public) celebration.65 This early construction of disability 
laid the groundwork for public support for government regulation of 
disability through medical and rehabilitative lenses and firmly rooted 
disability as part of the social welfare system rather than civil rights. 
B.  Stealth Advocacy and the Absence of Public Contestation 
Second, disability rights emerged without the same degree of public 
contestation necessary to change underlying norms.66 Consider the very 
public protests and national marches associated with other civil rights 
movements (race, gender, sexuality, as examples). While people with 
disabilities have organized to demand equality under the law, there have been 
fewer sustained televised protests.67 Media coverage of the civil rights 
movement—including television, radio, and print—made it possible for 
American households to discuss and debate the sights and sounds of the 
struggle for racial justice.68 Iconic images of African American protestors 
being attacked with fire hoses and police dogs, physically beaten and verbally 
tormented for seeking equality in education and public accommodations 
 
64 E.g., Pushkin v. Regents of the University of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372, 1385 (10th Cir. 1981) 
(explaining that disability discrimination “often occurs under the guise of extending a helping hand 
or a mistaken, restrictive belief as to the limitations of .	.	. persons [with disabilities]”). 
65 This dynamic is mirrored in the parenting context where parents of children with disabilities 
who are devoted to their children (as are many other parents) are often lionized as sacrificing 
themselves or being “better” parents. See, e.g., Amialya Durairaj, Quiet Heroes: Caregivers of Children 
with Disabilities Face Big Pressures, Rewards, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Mar. 19, 2019, 11:20 AM), 
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/caregiver/sd-he-caregiver-special-needs-20190225-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/7WE5-9NVM] (describing the caretaking provided by parents who leave the 
workforce to care for a child with disabilities, one of whom stated that “[t]here are heroes walking 
around us every day . . . [q]uiet heroes who are taking care of a special person . . . . They give their 
life up to take care of them.”). 
66 See, e.g., DAVID PETTINICCHIO, POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT: DISABILITY RIGHTS AND 
THE CYCLE OF AMERICAN POLICY REFORM 6-7 (2019) (“[T]he genesis of disability rights policy is 
not rooted in the demands of a grassroots political movement .	.	.	.”); see also Michael Selmi, Interpreting 
the Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme Court Rewrote the Statute, and Why Congress Did Not 
Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 525 (2008) (“[T]he overwhelming congressional support for the 
[ADA] obscured a broad congressional indifference to the specifics of the legislation.”). 
67 This is not a criticism of the disability rights activists, rather a commentary on the priorities 
of media outlets and how their lack of attention denied the movement its capacity to ignite a spark 
and sustain a fire. 
68 See, e.g., David Treadwell, Journalists Discuss Coverage of Movement: Media Role in Civil Rights 
Era Reviewed, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 5, 1987, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-
1987-04-05-mn-380-story.html [https://perma.cc/G9P3-J4T5]. 
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seared into the public’s consciousness.69 According to Representative (and 
civil rights giant) John Lewis, “[t]he civil rights movement would have been 
like a bird without wings if it hadn’t been for the news media.”70 
This is not to say that disability activists were not out there fighting for 
disability rights. To the contrary, protests such as the sit-ins in 1977 in San 
Francisco and elsewhere challenging the Secretary of the U.S. Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare’s (HEW) failure to issue regulations to 
enforce Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the Capitol Crawl in 
1990 challenging physical inaccessibility, or, more recently, ADAPT “die-in” in 
the Capitol challenging the GOP’s attempts to repeal (and replace) the 
Affordable Care Act (a.k.a. “Obamacare”) with legislation designed to slash 
Medicaid budgets, have captured public attention even if only for a moment.71  
The problem was not whether people saw it, but how they processed what 
they were seeing. Tellingly, disability activist, Judith Heumann, recounts the 
initial reaction of HEW officials to the protests in San Francisco: “[O]fficials 
treated us with condescension, giving us cookies and punch as if we were on 
some kind of field trip.”72 HEW officials did change their tone when they 
witnessed the power of the San Francisco protest and, ultimately, HEW 
Secretary Joseph Califano signed the Section 504 regulations.73 However, the 
dismissive reception of disability rights advocates reflects powerful social 
norms of care and paternalism and stands in stark contrast to government 
reactions to contemporaneous peer protests in other civil rights movements. 
 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 The sit-in in San Francisco lasted about a month, whereas those in other cities lasted only a 
day or two. See Andrew Grim, Sitting-in for Disability Rights: The Section 504 Protests of the 1970s, 
NAT’L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST. (July 8, 2015), https://americanhistory.si.edu/blog/sitting-disability-
rights-section-504-protests-1970s [https://perma.cc/28FP-MLDB] (explaining that the sit-in in San 
Francisco lasted twenty-five days); S.E. Smith, Why Disability Rights Activists Stormed Mitch 
McConnell’s Office, ROLLING STONE (June 23, 2017, 3:33 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/ 
politics/politics-news/why-disability-rights-activists-stormed-mitch-mcconnells-office-196423/ [https:// 
perma.cc/UE2V-V3Y5] (explaining that disability rights activists staged a sit-in outside of Senate 
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell’s office and were arrested and removed by police the same day); 
Jessica Estepa, Senate Healthcare Bill Protesters Dragged Away from ‘Die-In’ at Mitch McConnell’s Office, USA 
TODAY (June 22, 2017, 12:36 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2017/ 
06/22/protesters-have-sit-mitch-mcconnells-office/419748001/ [https://perma.cc/9M69-YYDN] (capturing 
video and social media links and describing the power of the ‘die-in’). 
72 Grim, supra note 71. 
73 Id. Another publicly recognized disability protest, the Capitol Crawl, occurred in 1990 in 
the weeks leading up to the ADA. People with physical disabilities dragged their bodies up the 
Capitol steps to demonstrate the lack of physical accessibility at the home of national lawmaking. 
See generally JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY 131-36 (1994) (describing the activism of ADAPT, 
including the Capitol Crawl, designed to change public perceptions of people with disabilities as 
passive, dependent recipients of pity). 
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The history of the ADA’s promulgation offers another perspective on the 
dominant social norms paving the way for it and its narrow interpretation by 
courts. One of the reasons that the ADA may have passed so quickly through 
committee is that its proponents—lawmakers with direct or family 
connections to disability—framed the ADA as an extension of existing laws 
such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973.74 A dominant moral narrative emerged framing support for the ADA 
as the “right thing” to do.75 
Importantly, fiscal conservatives backed the ADA not because of its moral 
appeal but, rather, because the bill tapped into their core values of self-reliance 
with a move from dependency and government welfare to work. This made 
disability rights “politically uncontroversial—as American as apple pie.”76 In 
fact, public opinion polls conducted after the passage of the ADA, for example, 
showed that 95% of those surveyed supported a general prohibition on 
disability discrimination and 83% of those surveyed agreed with the 
proposition that employers should provide reasonable accommodations to 
people with disabilities.77 Controlled publicity in combination with a 
universal, politically salient message paved the way for bipartisan approval for 
the ADA, a comprehensive civil rights law. Consider the fact that President 
George H.W. Bush signed the ADA into law the same year (about three 
months before) he successfully vetoed another comprehensive civil rights bill, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1990, that sought to, among other goals, amend 
provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to make clear (to the Supreme 
Court, among others) plaintiffs’ rights to remedy employment discrimination 
based on theories of disparate impact and mixed-motive cases.78 Ultimately, 
proponents on the Hill tapped into a lack of knowledge about disability among 
members of the public and within the government itself, which may have 
allowed them to shepherd the ADA through more easily but, in retrospect, 
 
74 Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) 
Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825, 904-07 (2003). 
75 See PETTINICCHIO, supra note 66, at 4 (“Working to provide economic opportunities and 
rights to people with disabilities meant doing the morally right thing.”). 
76 Id. at 4 (internal quotation omitted). 
77 Selmi, supra note 66, at 526 n.15. 
78 Civil Rights Act of 1990, H.R. 4000, 101st Cong. (2d Sess. 1990); S. 2104, 101st Cong. (2d Sess. 
1990). As an example, 
[T]he [Bush] Administration’s political investment in the disability rights legislation 
was inapposite to its investment in other civil rights issues generally, and the 1990 bill 
specifically. For example, presidential candidate George Bush endorsed in principle 
comprehensive disability rights legislation. In contrast, President Bush opposed in 
principle legislation to overturn the June 1989 decisions. 
Reginald C. Govan, Honorable Compromises and the Moral High Ground: The Conflict Between the Rhetoric 
and the Content of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 72-73 (1993). 
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may have traded off against meaningful legislative and public debate and 
discussion about the broad scope of disability in society and what it would 
actually take to combat disability discrimination.79 
C.  The Difficulty of Defining Disability 
A third, related factor that has undermined the stability of disability 
rights is the unresolved tension between public perceptions and legal 
definitions of disability, a conflict that has unfolded principally in courts and 
places of public accommodations.80 The ADA’s drafters intended that it 
provide remedies to a broad class of people with disabilities.81 However, 
existing social norms at the time largely reflected public understanding of 
people with disabilities as those who manifested a narrower set of visible and 
other sensory markers of disability—white canes, wheelchairs, service 
animals—what I have previously called the “aesthetics of disability.”82 These 
aesthetic markers became (and continue to be) the line between the 
“deserving disabled” and those perpetrating fraud and attempting to game 
the system. Why is this problematic? Consider public adjudication of 
disability, that is, the ways in which the public polices disability. Those 
without aesthetic markers who “look fine” are perceived as able-bodied people 
simply faking disability for premier access to parking, shorter lines at 
Disneyland, or priority boarding at airports. Aesthetic markers have become 
the gold standard of probative, legal evidence of disability and mark the 
parameters of standing and scope of protection for individuals with 
disabilities. They lack nuance and do not reflect the actual experiences of 
people with disabilities who, more accurately, fall along a continuum with 
respect to variables such as severity, consistency, visibility, and mitigation. 
This is a key difference between disability and other civil rights laws. To avail 
yourself of protection from disability discrimination, unlike racial or gender-
based discrimination, you have to first prove the legitimacy of your disability, a 
 
79 Selmi, supra note 66, at 539 (“Among advocates, the lack of legislative opposition is almost 
always seen as desirable because it speeds the bill’s journey through the legislature.”). 
80 See generally Harris, Taking Disability, supra note 62. 
81 Justin Dart, President Reagan’s Republican political appointee to the National Council on 
the Handicapped, and Robert Burgdorf, a law professor and lawyer for the National Council on the 
Handicapped, drafted the early versions of the ADA. PETTINICCHIO, supra note 66, at 11-12; see 42 
U.S.C. §	12102(1) (1990) (defining “disability” as a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities of an individual, a record of such an impairment, or being 
regarded as having such an impairment). 
82 Jasmine E. Harris, The Aesthetics of Disability, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 895, 897 (2019) 
[hereinafter Harris, Aesthetics]. 
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legal interpretation that requires direct contention with social norms.83 A person 
with a disability under the ADA is someone with “a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.”84 An 
individual can meet this definition in one of three ways: showing they have an 
actual disability, a record of a disability (e.g., cancer in remission), or have no 
disability but are nevertheless “regarded as” having a disability.85 
Courts struggled during the early years of the ADA to make sense of a 
law, in which, for example, a person must meet normative standards of 
disability but also be able to meet the requirements of a job designed by and 
for an ableist, neurotypical world.86 The early doctrine in Title I was largely 
confined to the gateway definition of disability with defendant-employers 
emerging victorious at astounding rates.87 Less than a decade after the ADA 
went into effect, the Supreme Court decided the “Sutton Trilogy,” a trio of 
cases under Title I on how courts should treat mitigating measures that can 
make the underlying effects of a disability better (such as medication or 
assistive devices) and, thus, render the person nondisabled as a statutory 
matter.88 Plaintiffs in these cases had different degrees of severity of visual 
 
83 Legal interpretation and application to a set of facts requires attention to existing social 
norms and values that underwrote applicable laws in the first place. My thesis touches on scholarly 
debates about modes of legal interpretation and their relationship to existing or aspirational social 
norms. The nuances of these debates are beyond the scope of this Essay. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. 
Pojanowski, Reading Statutes in the Common Law Tradition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1358-59 (2015) 
(introducing the general arguments for different approaches to statutory interpretation and how 
they fit into the contemporary debate on statutory interpretation). 
84 42 U.S.C. §	12102(1) (2018). 
85 28 C.F.R. §	35.108(a)(1) (2019). 
86 This is known as the “double-bind.” 
87 See, e.g., Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. 
CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 99, 100 (1999) (reviewing existing ADA Title I employment 
cases and outcomes and finding that defendants prevail at the trial level in 93% of cases and prevail 
in 84% of cases at the appellate level); Ruth Colker, Winning and Losing Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 248-57 (2001) (examining Title I decisions from the federal 
appellate courts and advancing three findings: (1) the district courts found for defendants in 94% of 
these cases; (2) when plaintiffs appealed unfavorable district court opinions, the court of appeals 
reversed the lower courts in only 12% of cases; and (3) when defendants appealed unfavorable district 
court opinions, the courts of appeals reversed in whole or in part in 60% of cases). 
88 See supra note 5. 
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impairments89 and high blood pressure,90 impairments that if viewed as legal 
disabilities could bring a significant number of people—who, at the time, 
were not considered “disabled” by normative standards—into the protected 
class. Such a sweeping view of disability that included people who could 
successfully minimize the disabling effects of their impairments, the Court 
reasoned, was not what Congress intended.91 Nine years later, Congress 
retorted with the ADA Amendments Act, replacing the Sutton Trilogy with 
clarifying language that a person’s impairment should be assessed in its 
unmitigated state in any determination of whether they meet the legal 
definition of disability, thus underscoring its intent for a broad protected 
class.92 Despite the Amendment, social norms have not yet shifted to reflect 
the Congressional directive.93 
The current public health crisis and the emerging forms of disability 
discrimination simply reinforce these problematic norms and, as a result, 
render disability rights expendable. Consider the language used to describe 
those who are “at risk” of contracting the coronavirus or experiencing the 
 
89 For example, the plaintiffs in Sutton were two pilots (also twin sisters) with severe 
nearsightedness (myopia). With corrective lenses, they each had twenty-twenty vision but, without 
correction, their vision limited their ability to see, among other functional limitations such as flying 
a plane. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999). While the plaintiff in Albertson’s 
could not correct for his monocular vision, the Court considered whether the mere existence of an 
impairment could reflexively meet the statutory definition of disability. Albertson’s, Inc. v. 
Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 559 (1999). 
90 The plaintiff in Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., a mechanic with high blood pressure, 
took medication to manage his hypertension. 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999). The Court held that analysis 
of whether he met the threshold definition of disability required the employer to examine him in 
his mitigated state—that is, when medicated, did his hypertension substantially limit one or more 
of his major life activities? Id. 
91 For example, the Court in Sutton stated that, 
Finally, and critically, the Congressional finding that 43 million Americans have one 
or more physical or mental disabilities, see §	12101(a)(1), requires the conclusion that 
Congress did not intend to bring under the ADA’s protection all those whose 
uncorrected conditions amount to disabilities. That group would include more than 
160 million people. Because petitioners allege that with corrective measures their 
vision is 20/20 or better, they are not actually disabled under subsection (A). 
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 472. 
92 In 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court heard a trio of disability cases—referred to as the “Sutton 
Trilogy”—concerning the threshold definition of “disability” under the ADA. See Sutton v. United 
Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (lead case); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 
(1999); Albertson’s Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999). Congress made clear with the ADA 
Amendments that it did not agree fully with the Court’s approach to these cases. See ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, §	4(a), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §	12101 
(2020)) (providing an illustrative list of “major life activities” and clarifying that the definition of 
disability be construed “in favor of broad coverage,” a direct response to the Sutton Trilogy). 
93 Emens, supra note 61, at 1387 (“The law will not be interpreted or implemented effectively 
until attitudes toward disability change.”). 
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worst of the virus. The virus was portrayed initially as risky for a small 
group—older adults and people with disabilities. Federal and state officials 
politicized this language to offer relative comfort to most Americans and 
justified their inattention by falling back on problematic social norms of 
disability. It allowed many people to keep disability at arm’s length, as do the 
aesthetics of disability, to see the risk as minimal to them and falling mainly 
on a small group of wheelchair users or people with intellectual and 
developmental disabilities who require support to perform daily tasks and 
self-care. Even when the messages expanded to include people with 
underlying health conditions, many continued to portray this group as 
different and distinct from people with disabilities when, in effect, there is 
tremendous overlap. As a result, these narratives further obscure the breadth 
and complexity of disability in society. 
III.  BEYOND COVID-19 
This Essay has applied a disability rights lens to the current crisis as a 
descriptive mechanism. I have argued that moving beyond individual 
instances of discrimination shows how the current pandemic is a 
manifestation of a much bigger problem about the frailty of disability rights. 
Part III argues for continued application of this disability lens to understand 
disability discrimination that will likely emerge beyond health rationing. We 
have a unique opportunity to tackle sticky norms of disability that power 
eugenic chants and inspire signs at recent coronavirus “liberty rallies” calling 
for Americans to “sacrifice the weak” for the greater good.94 
A critical component of life beyond COVID-19 is to approach disability 
not as a byline to invoke indifference or pity because of “helplessness” or 
increased vulnerability, but to recognize that vulnerabilities have been created 
by aggregate (and deliberate) legislative and policy decisions designed to 
attend to an able-bodied and neurotypical world.95 It would be a mistake to 
view reforms through the lens of charity or pity, i.e., the status quo, because 
it will only perpetuate where we are—with disability rights on shaky ground. 
Instead, an opportunity exists to see the prioritization of nondisabled lives as 
discrimination when we apply a disability rights lens and unpack the 
structural choices that have left people with disabilities more susceptible to 
disparate treatment and impact. 
 
94 Chacour Koop, ‘Sacrifice the Weak’ and ‘Give Me Liberty’: Signs at Coronavirus Protests Across US, 
MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 21, 2020, 10:19 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/coronavirus/ 
article242182796.html [https://perma.cc/K7ST-4VH8]. 
95 Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human 
Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008). 
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A.  Identifying the Next Waves of Disability Discrimination 
Existential fears of human mortality, in large part, underwrite disability 
discrimination. Consider how people react when they encounter the aesthetics 
of disability.96 For example, facial disfigurements may invoke disgust, non-
normative speech or behavior anger, and amputees may invoke pity.97 All three 
of these examples, however, are rooted, at least to some degree, in a person’s 
fears about death, vulnerability, difference, and dependence.98 
Fear will linger long after COVID-19, and may lead to greater 
manifestations of intentional and targeted discrimination such as recent attacks 
on Asian Americans, fueled, in no small part, by the President’s repeated 
references to coronavirus as “the Chinese virus.”99 Racist verbal attacks have 
escalated, at times, to physical violence. One affected individual noted: 
It’s a look of disdain	.	.	. [like] “[h]ow dare you exist in my world? You are a 
reminder of this disease, and you don’t belong in my world” .	.	.	. It’s especially 
hard when you grow up here and expect this world to be yours equally. But we 
do not live in that world anymore. That world does not exist.100 
Evidence of discrimination is coming to light in housing101 and 
employment102 and may increase when states lift shelter-in-place emergency 
orders and more businesses reopen (or close permanently). Disability 
antidiscrimination laws should be critical diagnostic and prescriptive tools to 
understand and remedy the next waves of discrimination. However, as this 
Essay argues, the reach and efficacy of the law’s application will continue to 
rely on the depth and scope of social norms of disability. 
For example, the ADA, in theory, offers three broad categories of people 
considered “disabled” that can be used to remedy COVID-19 related 
 
96 See Harris, Aesthetics, supra note 82, at 904. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 930. 
99 Sabrina Tavernise & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Spit On, Yelled At, Attacked: Chinese-Americans 
Fear for Their Safety, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/us/chinese-
coronavirus-racist-attacks.html [https://perma.cc/M5ZT-TCUZ]. 
100 Id. 
101 See, e.g., Emily Shugerman, Coronavirus Heroes Are Getting Tossed From Their Homes by 
Scared Landlords, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 26, 2020), https://www.thedailybeast.com/coronavirus-nurses-
face-eviction-housing-discrimination-from-scared-landlords?ref=scroll [https://perma.cc/KXY2-P8Y8] 
(describing discrimination experienced by healthcare workers who are being evicted from 
apartments and homes on the basis of potential exposure to COVID-19). Although this article does 
not make a direct connection to disability, these healthcare workers may have a claim under the ADA 
or FHA for disability discrimination. Under the ADA, the workers may meet the definition of 
disability through the “regarded as” prong. 
102 Doctrinal uncertainty in disability law that predated COVID-19 will be further muddied 
by the virus. For example, questions surrounding the gig economy and how to classify workers and 
employers for purposes of ADA liability or the specifics of web accessibility. 
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discrimination. First, for people actively fighting the virus, are they people with 
an actual “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
life activities” pursuant to the statute?103 Although the ADA excludes 
“transitory” impairments (and this may become a litigated issue),104 COVID-
19 may still qualify as an impairment for certain people for whom the effects of 
the virus last beyond contagion such that it affects the respiratory system and 
substantially limits the major life activity of breathing. Or, a person who has a 
compromised immune system and may be at higher risk of contracting and then 
experiencing complications because of COVID-19 may meet the legal 
definition through an analysis of the underlying health impairment and not 
directly through COVID-19. Second, people who have a “record of” a “physical 
or mental impairment” under the actual disability prong and face 
discrimination based on their record of the impairment may also have standing 
to recover.105 Similar questions about the duration of COVID-19 and its 
severity for the individual may pose important questions of law and fact, 
respectively, as they will under the “actual” disability prong but may not create 
the same hurdles from people with underlying health conditions. Third, and 
perhaps the most promising avenue to combat the next waves of discrimination 
facing many in the COVID-19 context is the “regarded as” prong,106 where a 
covered entity under the ADA (employer, state, municipality, place of public 
accommodation) treats someone who does not have COVID-19 as if they do 
and present safety or other risks. The “regarded as” prong, relative to the other 
two prongs, best addresses problematic social norms of disability that lead to 
discriminatory treatment against people with disabilities.107 
In employment, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission recently 
classified COVID-19 as a “direct threat” per se.108 Employers now have greater 
latitude to screen job candidates either directly related to COVID-19 or 
particular risks associated with certain health conditions. As public health 
authorities learn more about correlated symptoms beyond fever, cough, and 
 
103 42 U.S.C. §	12102(1)(A) (2018). Legal questions may arise concerning the nuances of what 
constitutes “active” COVID-19, in particular, if someone has a mild or asymptomatic case, or if 
contagiousness lasts for a two-week period (as the research current suggests) for purposes of using 
the “actual” disability prong under the ADA’s disability definition. 
104 See id. §	12102(3)(B) (excluding “transitory impairment[s]” defined as those with an “actual 
or expected duration of 6 months or less”). 
105 Id. §§	12102(1)(A), (B). 
106 Id. 42 U.S.C. §	12102(1)(C). 
107 See Harris, Aesthetics, supra note 82, at 968-70 (discussing the ways in which this approach best 
serves the goals of disability law in educational, employment, and public accommodation contexts). 
108 U.S. EQ. EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMI’N, EEOC-NVTA-2009-3, PANDEMIC 
PREPAREDNESS IN THE WORKPLACE AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (2020), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pandemic-preparedness-workplace-and-americans-disabilities-
act [https://perma.cc/E8LC-L4YG] (“Based on guidance of the CDC and public health authorities 
as of March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic meets the direct threat standard.”). 
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difficulty breathing, employers may have increased latitude to ask questions 
about nonspecific symptoms such as diarrhea or vomiting that may reveal 
underlying health impairments unrelated to the coronavirus. Failure to hire 
cases are notoriously difficult to prosecute under non-pandemic conditions 
because of implicit biases that make causation difficult to prove; these cases 
may be even harder to win in COVID or post-COVID environments.109 
For existing employees who have greater protections from discrimination in 
the workplace including pretextual or improper discharge, invasive and unequal 
medical exams, and confidentiality of medical information,110 COVID-19’s 
classification as a “direct threat” may offer employers greater flexibility during 
this time, but disability rights laws continue to apply.111 The operative question 
now is how and, as businesses reopen, inquiries should focus on returning to full 
enforcement and compliance with disability rights laws. Employers may create 
conditions precedent for employees (including timetables for transitions), to 
come to work, stay home, and return to work that require employees to provide 
HIPAA protected medical information as well as having them physically submit 
to onsite testing with temporal scans for fevers or blood tests. Relatedly, 
employers will likely have access to medical and genetic data and critical 
questions include what employers do with that information, how it is protected 
(or not) and limits on sharing (or selling) data.112 
Statutory concepts in disability law such as “direct threat,”113 
“reasonable accommodations,”114 “qualified,”115 and “business 
 
109 See, e.g., Wheeler v. Lisle-Woodridge Fire Prot. Dist., 804 F. Supp. 2d 759, 764 (N.D. Ill. 
2011) (finding plaintiff applicant to the local fire protection district failed to show a violation of the 
ADA for failure to hire because there was no evidence that the district perceived the applicant as 
having a substantially limiting impairment). 
110 42 U.S.C. §	12133 (2018); 28 C.F.R. §	35.130 (2019). 
111 What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act and the 
Coronavirus, U.S. EQ. EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (last visited Apr. 23, 2020), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/wysk_ada_rehabilitaion_act_coronavirus.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/2WWZ-AWLT]. 
112 Interesting questions may arise in the context of the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, Section 1557 
of the ACA, Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, and HIPAA as public (and private) 
laboratories pool information about blood samples to research antibodies and to develop a vaccine, 
including who controls this data and how we define “public interest” usage. 
113 42 U.S.C. §	12111(3) (2018) (defining “direct threat” as “a significant risk to the health or 
safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation”). 
114 Id. §	12111(9) (defining “reasonable accommodation” as “making existing facilities used by 
employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities” and “job restructuring, 
part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification 
of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training 
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar 
accommodations for individuals with disabilities”). 
115 Id. §	12111(8) (defining “qualified individual” as “an individual who, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that 
such individual holds or desires”). 
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necessity”116 will hit the mainstage and require careful analysis to avoid 
pretextual discrimination. Employers must manage health risks related 
to COVID-19 based on individualized assessments that look at the risk of 
the particular person to self or others in the workplace.117 General 
guidance on COVID-19 or related health concerns are insufficient to 
justify exclusion without an assessment of how COVID-19 manifests for 
the person, which may be complicated as we learn more about how the 
virus operates and spreads, including those who are asymptomatic 
carriers. Similarly, questions of whether a person with a disability 
continues to be “qualified” to perform the “essential functions” of a job 
may arise as employers look to eliminate or restructure particular 
positions, shutter businesses, or institute layoffs to deal with economic 
fallout from social distancing and shelter-in-place measures. 
Defenses in the ADA will become targets of judicial interpretation, for 
example, “undue hardship” (cost considerations) with respect to the provision 
of reasonable accommodations in employment, “readily achievable” with 
respect to duties to remove architectural barriers to access, and “fundamental 
alterations” of a program or service or place of public accommodation. 
Accommodations in employment such as the provision of job coaches to 
enable some people with intellectual and developmental disabilities to learn 
how to perform specific tasks of certain jobs may move from a “should do” to 
an “undue hardship” or burden for the employer and be viewed as expendable. 
Similarly, summer camps in some cities operated by the city departments of 
parks and recreation provide some children with disabilities aides to ensure 
access to general camps and promote inclusion. Will these cities seek to cut 
funding for inclusion and revert to segregated services and programs as 
disability law falls back on norms of benevolence rather than legal rights? 
Many cities have already announced furloughs and layoffs, which will further 
 
116 Id. §	12112(b)(6) (permitting employers to use selection criteria that tend to screen out 
individuals with disabilities when those criteria are job-related and consistent with business 
necessity); id. §	12112(d)(4)(A) (permitting medical examinations of employees when the exams are 
job-related and consistent with business necessity). 
117 See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998) (“The existence, or nonexistence, of a 
significant risk must be determined from the standpoint of the person who refuses the treatment or 
accommodation, and the risk assessment must be based on medical or other objective evidence.”); 
Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987) (identifying four factors for 
determining whether a person handicapped by a contagious disease is “otherwise qualified” under 
Rehabilitation Act: the nature of risk; the duration of the risk; the severity of the risk; and the 
probability that the disease will be transmitted and will cause varying degrees of harm); Chevron 
U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 85 n.5 (2002) ( “[T]he EEOC has required that judgments 
based on the direct threat provision be made on the basis of individualized risk assessments.”). 
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exacerbate problems of limited resources and personnel.118 Finally, as the 
world moves online for work, education, relationships, and entertainment, 
technology and web accessibility will be increasingly important.119 
B.  Reimagining Legal and Policy Interventions120 
Disability rights law mainly operates ex post, however, its drafters aspired to 
preempt discrimination by, over time, redesigning the physical world, 
employment, programs, services, travel, and even relationships. Generally, there 
is no hard-reset button for massive institutional reform; the world keeps going 
and we need to build around it. But that’s the problem—the tension between 
crafting remedies sufficiently individualized to meet the needs of a particular 
individual with a disability (and not creating, for example, stock accommodations 
for all people with X diagnosis), while, at the same time, needing broader 
institutional reforms. In many ways, COVID-19 has created an opportunity for a 
hard reset in several areas. It has forced us to rethink how we live and relate to 
each other, prime conditions for normative and structural reforms. 
 
118 See, e.g., Tony Romm, Mass Layoffs Begin in Cities and States amid Coronavirus Fallout, 
Threatening Education, Sanitation, Health and Safety, WASH. POST (Apr. 29, 2020, 6:02 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/29/cities-states-layoffs-furloughs-coronavirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/A9SV-3KUM] (“Between 300,000 and 1 million public-sector workers could soon 
be out of a job or sent home without pay .	.	.	.”). 
119 Questions of web accessibility largely focus on the “how” and not “whether” under the 
ADA. After announcing its position in 1996, the Department of Justice has “repeatedly affirmed the 
application of [T]itle III to Web sites of public accommodations.” Nondiscrimination on the Basis 
of Disability; Accessibility of Web Information and Services of State and Local Government 
Entities and Public Accommodations, 75 Fed. Reg. 43460, 43464 (July 26, 2010) (to be codified at 
28 C.F.R. pts. 35, 36). See also Robles v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 913 F.3d 898, 905-06 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(holding that the ADA applied to a restaurant chain’s website and mobile application “which connect 
customers to the goods and services of [its] physical restaurants”); Gomez v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 
323 F. Supp. 3d 1368, 1376 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (“[The defendant’s] website is a place of public 
accommodation within the meaning of the ADA.”); Castillo v. Jo-Ann Stores, LLC, 286 F. Supp. 
3d 870, 881 (N.D. Ohio 2018) (holding that a sufficient nexus existed between the defendant’s website 
and its brick-and-mortar stores). 
120 This Essay offers a number of examples of possible legal and policy interventions to 
consider. I intentionally omitted a discussion of reimagining healthcare and the social safety net, not 
only because of page limitations, but also because these are the obvious places legislators and 
constituents will push for after a public health crisis. I want to draw attention to other areas outside 
of healthcare where we ought to be looking not only to preempt and remedy discrimination, but also 
to design broader structural reforms and rethink how we approach non-traditional areas such as 
national security where disability is ever-present but never directly addressed. See generally Jasmine 
E. Harris, Disability as National Security (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Harris, Disability as National] (advancing this argument). 
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1.  Olmstead Enforcement 
COVID-19 tells us about the insecurity and risks of congregate settings for 
those with and without disabilities, for example, jails, prisons, nursing homes, 
psychiatric hospitals, larger group homes, and immigrant detention centers.121 
This is an interesting time to think about Olmstead enforcement in three ways.122 
First, cases where institutions failed to transition residents capable of 
living in community-based settings to these less restrictive environments. 
This is more of a traditional application of Olmstead. 
Second, another interpretation of Olmstead may require constant 
evaluation and reevaluation of people in restrictive settings to ensure that they 
are in the most inclusive setting appropriate to the individual. In other words, 
change is required not only when the individual can be better served in the 
community, but also when conditions arise making institutional settings 
inappropriate for all people with disabilities and requiring their preemptive or 
 
121 Gabrielle Coppola & Edvard Pettersson, Most Likely to be Infected: The Faithful, the Jailed or the Old, 
BLOOMBERG L. (Apr. 11, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/most-
likely-to-be-infected-the-faithful-the-jailed-or-the-old [https://perma.cc/VGR3-DCBT]; see, e.g., Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Dawson v. Asher, No. 2:20-409 at 
10 (W.D. Wash. filed Mar. 16, 2020) (“The conditions of immigration detention facilities pose a 
heightened public health risk for the spread of COVID-19 that is even greater than in non-carceral 
institutions.”). The plaintiffs in Dawson v. Asher suffer a variety of health conditions that put them 
at increased risk for severe illness or death if they were to contract COVID-19. Id. at 3-4 (describing 
conditions including advanced age, lung disease, heart disease, diabetes, autoimmune disorders, and 
asthma); see also Josiah Rich et al., We Must Release Prisoners to Lessen the Spread of Coronavirus, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 17, 2020, 4:01 PM), https:// www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/17/ 
we-must-release-prisoners-lessen-spread-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/ADG2-XS83] (noting that 
COVID-19 endangers not only prisoners but also the communities surrounding these facilities). 
Finally, psychiatric facilities are suffering similar complexities amidst the pandemic. See Danny 
Hakim, ‘They Want to Forget Us’: Psychiatric Hospital Workers Feel Exposed, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/nyregion/coronavirus-new-york-psychiatric-hospitals.html 
[https://perma.cc/T56T-UL86] (“Psychiatric hospitals present special challenges to the strictures of 
social distancing, since many patients are allowed to come and go in and out of the center, and once 
inside they are not cloistered.”). 
122 Olmstead requires states to eliminate unnecessary segregation of individuals with 
disabilities, and to mandate that persons with disabilities obtain services in the most integrated 
setting appropriate to their respective needs. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 597 
(1999). To ensure the benefits of Olmstead are fully felt by individuals with disabilities, the United 
States Department of Justice “has addressed the unnecessary segregation of people with physical, 
mental health, or intellectual and developmental disabilities .	.	. in various residential and non-
residential settings, nationwide,” an effort termed more broadly as Olmstead enforcement. 
Department of Justice Celebrates 20th Anniversary of the Olmstead Supreme Court Decision Protecting the 
Rights of Americans with Disabilities, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (June 19, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/blog/department-justice-celebrates-20th-anniversary-olmstead-supreme-court-decision-
protecting [https://perma.cc/A59R-H6LQ]. 
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emergency release.123 In other words, reduction of the population of people 
with disabilities in congregate settings may be the only meaningful way to 
prevent public health emergencies from disproportionately affecting people 
with disabilities because social distancing or other prescriptive practices are 
not possible. Given the percentages of people with disabilities in jails and 
prisons, this could be the modern wave of deinstitutionalization litigation as 
we saw in the 1970s and Olmstead can take a doctrinal lead.124 
Third, we may see a rollback of rights in areas that pre-COVID-19 had 
even less public buy-in, such as sexual, reproductive, and parental rights of 
people with disabilities. Title II of the ADA and Olmstead can also be used to 
ensure equal opportunity to access these rights.125 
2.  Cleburne and Rational Basis Review126 
That disability antidiscrimination remedies tend to focus almost 
exclusively on statutory relief is largely the product of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. 127 The Court in 
Cleburne held the applicable level of constitutional scrutiny of state action in 
the context of disability is rational basis review, which results in significant 
deference to states.128 Justice White, writing for the majority in Cleburne, 
reasoned that people with mental disabilities have a “reduced ability to cope 
with and function in the everyday world” and that they are different, 
immutably so.129 Accordingly, states have a legitimate interest in providing and 
caring for people with “mental disabilities,” and the legislature rather than the 
judiciary is better situated to determine the bounds of who falls within this 
 
123 See, e.g., Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 119-125, Money v. Pritzker, No. 1:20-02093 (N.D. Ill. 
filed Apr. 2, 2020) (alleging that the plaintiffs’ continued incarceration during the COVID-19 
epidemic violates the ADA); First Amended Class Action Complaint and Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus ¶¶ 225-231, Costa v. Bazron, No. 1:19-03185 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 16, 2020) (same). 
124 See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 601-02 (holding that the ADA requires states to offer community-
based treatment to qualified individuals); see also Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of 
Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 50 (2012) (noting the evolving nature of 
battles over deinstitutionalization). This is also a clear area where intersectionality allows us to 
structure legal claims that disproportionately affect people of color in these congregate settings. 
125 See, e.g., Natalie M. Chin, Group Homes as Sex Police and the Role of the Olmstead Integration 
Mandate, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 379, 449 (2018) (arguing that sexuality is “an integral 
aspect” of the community integration mandated by Olmstead). 
126 This Essay seeks to dust off Cleburne and generate scholarly discussions about its potential 
to reinvigorate what Professor Michael Waterstone has previously called “disability constitutional 
law.” See generally Waterstone, supra note 3. A full exploration of potential constitutional claims 
related to COVID-19 is beyond the scope of this Essay. 
127 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
128 Id at 446. 
129 Id. at 442. 
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group.130 Thereafter, the analysis of people with mental disabilities in Cleburne 
was extended to all people with disabilities in Board of Trustees of the University 
of Alabama v. Garrett without discussion or further examination.131 These 
decisions have perpetuated a harmful constitutional “otherness” to the 
disability classification.132 While Cleburne’s holding on rational basis may have 
stifled the development of a robust body of disability constitutional law to 
date, legal scholars have celebrated the Court’s openness in Cleburne to 
consider a “new type of equal protection review, one that is more granular” 
and has helped forge a pathway to equality for gay rights, for example.133 
Cleburne, even before COVID-19, was doctrinally relevant because states and 
municipalities still take actions that are facially discriminatory against people 
with disabilities—particularly those with mental disabilities—as we see playing 
out right now in the case of treatment rationing.134 Many areas of law persist in 
treating people with intellectual and developmental disabilities differently on 
the basis of a diagnosis—including, for example, family law, voting, civil 
commitment and guardianship proceedings.135 When plaintiffs assert equal 
protection challenges to these laws, courts cite Cleburne and exercise virtually 
unlimited deference to the state’s proffered justifications as rational.136 
COVID-19 examples of disability discrimination (current or future) may 
open the door to constitutional legal remedies. Advocates might consider 
disaggregating disability to take on problematic disability norms head on with 
respect to people with intellectual and developmental disabilities. While I do 
not advocate a global strategy to move away from the socio-political identity 
of disability, the facially discriminatory rationing policies and practices 
present an opportunity to return to Cleburne for people with intellectual and 
developmental disabilities. 
Why disaggregate disability for purposes of constitutional arguments? 
Professor Michael Waterstone has persuasively argued that the foundation of 
 
130 Id. at 442-43. 
131 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 (2001). 
132 Waterstone, supra note 3, at 541. 
133 William D. Araiza, Was Cleburne an Accident?, 19 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 621, 626-27 (2017). 
134 Waterstone, supra note 3, at 548. See also Cmty. Hous. Tr. v. Dep’t of Consumer & 
Regulatory Affairs, 257 F. Supp. 2d 208, 229 (D.D.C. 2003) (addressing a zoning ordinance that 
facially discriminated against people with mental disabilities); Complaint ¶¶ 52-88, Plack v. Perry 
Twp., No. 20-01160 (N.D. Ohio filed May 27, 2020) (alleging Perry Township violated federal 
housing and disability discrimination laws in its application of local zoning ordinances to prevent 
the operation of a residential group home for older adults and people with disabilities); Bagenstos, 
supra note 7, at 2 (“[T]he crisis standards of care adopted by hospitals and state agencies often employ 
explicit disability-based distinctions.”); Hellman & Nicholson, supra note 7, at 3 (arguing that 
healthcare rationing protocols that consider “quality of life” violate both the ADA and “the moral 
commitment to the equal worth of people with disabilities”). 
135 Waterstone, supra note 3, at 548. 
136 Id. at 550. 
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the disability rights movement rests on successful attempts to unite people 
with different disabilities to advocate for independence and self-reliance.137 
However, “any realistic assessment of disability constitutional rights needs to 
acknowledge that not everyone covered by the ADA would or should align 
with heightened constitutional analysis.”138 
It is certainly an easier lift to classify people with mental disabilities, or 
further disaggregated, those with intellectual and developmental disabilities, 
as an “insular and discrete class” with a history of unequal treatment based 
on stereotypes and prejudice rather than rooted in fact. Justice Marshall 
recognized this in Cleburne,139 and the Court overall agreed that as applied to 
the zoning question in Cleburne, the state’s actions were “irrational.”140 
Constitutional challenges that return to Cleburne’s narrower group of people 
with intellectual and developmental disabilities may open up space for 
application of its reasoning to a broader group of people with disabilities. 
Justices other than White in Cleburne and subsequent cases have 
acknowledged a willingness to think more progressively about the 
Constitution in the realm of disability. For example, Justices Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Breyer (joined by Justices Souter, Ginsberg, and Stevens) 
have, at different times, called for a more nuanced consideration of the 
constitutional dimension of disability discrimination.141 
3.  Disability as National Security142 
Finally, disability is a critically absent consideration in our national 
security law and policy. The suggestion that disability is even part of national 
security may, at first blush, seem odd.143 How can disability 
antidiscrimination laws contribute to or further national security interests? 
COVID-19 is a national, public health emergency that reveals significant 
fault lines in domestic institutions, emergency planning and preparedness, 
and responsiveness. 
 
137 Id. at 562. 
138 Id. 
139 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 461 (1985) (Marshall, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
140 Id. at 450. 
141 Waterstone, supra note 3, at 559. 
142 See generally Harris, Disability as National, supra note 120. 
143 Consider the common refrain that natural disasters do not discriminate. Beyoncé’s post-
Hurricane Harvey message, for example, noted: “Natural disasters don’t discriminate. They don’t see 
if you’re an immigrant, black or white, Hispanic or Asian, Jewish or Muslim, wealthy or poor .	.	.	. We’re 
all in this together.” Kevin Lui, ‘Natural Disasters Don’t Discriminate.’ Beyoncé Makes Heartfelt Appeal for 
Hurricane Harvey Relief, TIME (Sept. 13, 2017, 12:09 AM), https://time.com/4939064/beyonce-
hurricane-relief-houston-telethon [https://perma.cc/BT98-DLM2]. 
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Both bodies of law, national security and disability, regulate the 
construction of risk with a moral backdrop, albeit in different ways.144 
National security law and policy assess domestic and foreign threats to the 
American people, our political standing and general security,145 while 
disability law and policy interrogates problematic norms of disability that lead 
to discriminatory conduct, removes structural barriers preventing equal 
opportunities, and creates remedies to advance disability rights in 
employment (including benefits and privileges of employment), public 
services and programs, and places of public accommodations.146 When these 
two areas of law clash—such as in domestic responses to mass shootings, 
natural disasters or immigration—we are faced with increasing questions 
about the moral treatment of people with disabilities, their protection, and 
access to limited resources. The U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services recently published a report stating, “[w]e must continue to 
strengthen U.S. public health and health care systems to effectively and 
swiftly confront the devastating consequences of risks,” naming chemical, 
radiological, and nuclear weapons, cyber warfare, infectious diseases and 
associated pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters and human-caused 
incidents as posing the most pressing risks.147 
However, these plans often group people with disabilities in the 
populations of at-risk individuals requiring additional planning, rather than 
looking to contextualize the ways disability laws seeks to mitigate and 
eliminate risk.148 For example, Hurricane Sandy’s aftermath revealed New 
York’s “benign neglect” of citizens with disabilities who were stranded for 
days after the storm event, which was eventually found to be a violation of 
 
144 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Risk Regulation, 101 
COLUMBIA L. REV. 1479, 1482 (2001) (discussing the tension within disability law between what the 
author terms “technocratic” and “democratic” approaches to risk regulation). 
145 For example, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security defines its risk management 
approach as “the process for identifying, analyzing, and communicating risk and accepting, avoiding, 
transferring, or controlling it to an acceptable level considering associated costs and benefits of any 
actions taken.” CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV., R45812, ILLICIT DRUG FLOWS AND SEIZURES IN THE 
UNITED STATES: WHAT DO WE [NOT] KNOW? 15 (2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45812.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V6MA-P8A5]. 
146 The literature regarding public and private management of political risk is voluminous and 
beyond the scope of this paper. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL RISK 
MANAGEMENT: THE BRAVE NEW WORLD (Theodore H. Moran ed., 2004) (discussing risk 
assessment within the contemporary international political environment). 
147 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH SECURITY 
STRATEGY 2019-2022, 1, https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/planning/authority/nhss/Documents/NHSS-
Strategy-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/E836-QZJR]. 
148 See, e.g., id. at 2, 19, 21. 
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the ADA.149 This narrative is echoed in the wildfire preparedness and 
evacuation plans that often fail to adequately account for citizens with 
disabilities. California’s Camp Fire witnessed disproportionate deaths of 
people with disabilities who were physically unable to escape, or lacked the 
cognition to realize escape was necessary.150 From gun control to immigration 
and natural disasters such as wildfires and hurricanes, disability rights matter 
to our national security risk assessment, planning, and responses. 
CONCLUSION 
July marks the thirtieth anniversary of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, the most comprehensive civil rights legislation for people with 
disabilities in the United States. Whether or not we remain sheltered in place, 
reintegrated, or something in between, we cannot (and must not) return to 
“business as usual.” We have a unique opportunity for universal redesigns in 
different areas of law and society. The current pandemic has tragically 
surfaced unfiltered normative views of disability that will continue to 
undermine even the most progressive legislation unless we contend with 
them as a nation. 
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